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CAN A PATIENT-CENTERED ETHOS BE OTHER-
REGARDING?  OUGHT IT BE? 
Theodore W. Ruger*
The American health care system is built on a significant 
conceptual tension that grows more intense with each passing year; 
it devolves primary authority over medical decisions to 
individualized physician-patient transactions, while increasingly 
embodying notions of group solidarity and systemic 
interconnectedness in its overall design.  The passage earlier this 
year of the landmark Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(“PPACA”)1 only sharpens this tension.  Many of the PPACA’s most 
important measures reflect the principle of group solidarity.  For 
instance, insurers will be restricted in their ability to thinly slice 
risk pools by practicing age and gender rating and by enforcing 
preexisting-condition exclusions.2  The individual mandate to 
purchase insurance will drive more healthy Americans into larger 
private risk pools, and the prices they pay will in many cases be 
higher than is appropriate for their own age- and health-adjusted 
actuarial risk; this mandate will effectively result in a redistributive 
tax on youth and good health.3  On the public-finance side, the 
PPACA’s substantial expansions of Medicaid coverage will be funded 
primarily by higher taxes on affluent federal taxpayers, reflecting 
an unprecedented commitment to guarantee coverage for virtually 
every American below or near the poverty line.4  For all of these 
reasons and more, individualized patient and physician choices 
about utilization will, when aggregated, reverberate through an 
increasingly integrated system struggling with profound cost and 
quality concerns. 
Despite enforcing a more robust (and in my view long overdue) 
principle of collective solidarity in the overall health insurance 
 * Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
 1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010). 
 2. See § 1201, 124 Stat. at 154–61 (defining exclusive permissible rating 
criteria for individual and small-group markets). 
 3. See §§ 1501(a)(2)(G), 124 Stat. at 243; 10106(a), 124 Stat. at 908. 
 4. See Theda Skocpol & Vanessa Williamson, Obama and the 
Transformation of U.S. Public Policy: The Struggle for Health Reform, in 
SUPPLEMENT: HEALTH CARE REFORM UPDATE 1, 5 (Mark A. Hall ed., 2010) 
(describing the PPACA as “a bill that draws resources from the privileged to 
spread access to affordable health insurance to most of the U.S. citizenry”). 
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system design,5 the PPACA does little, in the short term at least, to 
address the individualistic variation in treatment decisions and 
utilization rates that many scholars and policy makers have pegged 
as a major problem in the American system.  High-profile examples 
of this feature of health care delivery abound.  A set of studies has 
found dramatic variations in the Medicare cost per patient in 
different regions of the country, even after controlling for all 
relevant health, population, and price-index variables.6  The studies 
concluded that differences in regional medical practice and 
utilization patterns cause these cost variations.7  Another study 
found that physicians’ willingness to prescribe expensive cox-2 
inhibitors to Medicaid patients for chronic pain relief varied from a 
low of eleven percent of applicable patients in one state up to 
seventy percent in another.8  Many scholars cite such therapeutic 
variations as the source of major cost and quality concerns.9
There is nothing new about this preference for individualization 
in American medicine, or about the correlative resistance to 
therapeutic standardization among providers and patients.  This 
norm has deep epistemological roots in the American medical 
profession, and has been preserved and entrenched by constitutional 
and legal structures of American health law until recent decades.  
Medical historians, such as John Harley Warner, have described the 
prevalence of a “principle of specificity” among American physicians 
as the profession coalesced and sought enhanced status in the mid-
nineteenth century.10  For American physicians seeking to distance 
themselves from the ideas of the major European medical centers, as 
well as from universalist therapeutic regimes like Thomsonianism 
and homeopathy, the notion of individualistic variation in treatment 
became a central intellectual precept of the profession.  So, for 
instance, a Boston physician writing in 1861 claimed that 
“[i]diosyncracy, or the peculiarities of the individual, are as 
anomalous and impossible to reduce to rule and measure, as the 
 5. See § 10106(a), 124 Stat. at 908. 
 6. See DARTMOUTH MED. SCH., THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE 
1998 (John E. Wennberg & Megan McAndrew Cooper eds., 1998); Elliott S. 
Fisher et al., The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending.  
Part 2: Health Outcomes and Satisfaction with Care, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL 
MED. 288 (2003); W. Pete Welch et al., Geographic Variation in Expenditures for 
Physicians’ Services in the United States, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 621 (1993). 
 7. See DARTMOUTH MED. SCH., supra note 6, at 2; Fisher et al., supra note 
6, at 288; Welch et al., supra note 6, at 625–27. 
 8. See Michael A. Fisher et al., Medicaid Prior-Authorization Programs 
and the Use of Cyclooxygenase-2 Inhibitors, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2187, 2187 
(2004). 
 9. See, e.g., Fisher et al., supra note 6, at 297–98. 
 10. See John Harley Warner, From Specificity to Universalism in Medical 
Therapeutics: Transformation in the 19th-Century United States, in SICKNESS 
AND HEALTH IN AMERICA: READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH 87, 87–91 (Judith Walzer Leavitt & Ronald L. Numbers eds., 1997). 
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passage of the clouds.”11  Professor Albert Stille of the University of 
Pennsylvania claimed in a major lecture in 1884 that “[t]here is also 
an art of medicine [that] completely eludes, or . . . flatly contradicts 
science.”12  Likewise, according to a Boston physician writing 
contemporaneously, “No two patients have the same constitutional 
or mental proclivities,” and thus, in language that clearly resonates 
with our own age’s debates about cost-effective research and 
standardized practice protocols applied to medical care, “[n]o ‘rule of 
thumb,’ no recourse to a formula-book, will avail for the proper 
treatment even of the typical diseases.”13
Like the recent Dartmouth Atlas studies reveal, in the past 
century such variation produced real and meaningful differences in 
treatment between otherwise similarly situated patients.  In a study 
of hospital records from two mid-nineteenth-century hospitals, 
Professor Warner documented the dramatically different 
therapeutic protocols employed contemporaneously by doctors at a 
major Boston hospital and a major Cincinnati hospital.14  Physicians 
at the latter site were much more likely to employ invasive 
techniques, like purging (induced by calomel or tartar enemic) and 
bloodletting (venesection), often with adverse results for the 
patient.15
That this conceptual preference for therapeutic 
individualization persisted for over a century and became 
successively more entrenched in the medical arena is no accident.  
Individual physician authority was a key intellectual foundation of 
American medicine in the nineteenth century, and its staying power 
through much of the twentieth century was fostered in no small part 
by the regime of American health law that arose 
contemporaneously.  The judicial doctrines that composed American 
health law from the middle of the nineteenth century until the last 
decades of the twentieth built on this diffused structure of medical 
authority that prevailed among American physicians.  Whereas 
liability rules and private institutional ordering might have 
operated over time to blunt or counteract the tendency toward 
diffused authority, the rules that courts framed from the middle of 
the nineteenth century until the middle of the twentieth only 
sharpened the individualistic and atomized nature of medical 
 11. David W. Cheever, The Value and the Fallacy of Statistics in the 
Observation of Disease, 63 BOS. MED. & SURGICAL J. 449, 483 (1861). 
 12. Alfred Stille, Professor of the Theory & Practice of Med., Univ. of Pa., 
Address to the Medical Classes of the University of Pennsylvania on 
Withdrawing from His Chair (Apr. 10, 1884), in 44 MED. NEWS 433, 435 (1884). 
 13. See Editorial, Routine Practice, 108 BOS. MED. & SURGICAL J. 42, 43 
(1883). 
 14. See generally John Harley Warner, Power, Conflict, and Identity in 
Mid-Nineteenth-Century American Medicine: Therapeutic Change at the 
Commercial Hospital in Cincinnati, 73 J. AM. HIST. 934 (1987). 
 15. See id. at 941. 
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authority.  As I explain in a longer work still in progress, the legal 
rules that operated in this way are numerous—ranging from the 
basic American constitutional structure that devolved authority over 
medicine, to the laws of myriad state governments, to the weak 
pressures for standardization imposed by state licensure regimes 
and liability rules that permitted multiple schools of thought and 
variation based on locality and practice setting.16  In the early 
twentieth century, other doctrines such as the bar on “corporate” 
practice of medicine worked to preserve therapeutic diversity by 
stunting the development of institutional forms of control over 
medical practice.17  Though many of these core doctrinal rules have 
been modified or abandoned today, health law played a major role in 
the care and feeding of medicine’s devolved authority structure well 
past the middle of the twentieth century, and relatedly contributed 
to its normative entrenchment today even as formal doctrinal levers 
have receded. 
In the past several decades, American medicine has become 
dramatically more patient centered, but hardly less individualistic.  
The substantial transformation of authority within the individual 
therapeutic relationship, which has been produced in the past 
several decades by the emphasis on patient autonomy and informed 
decision making,18 has not altered the orientation of medical 
authority.  Though the relative decisional authority of doctor and 
patient may have shifted, and the norms of communication and self-
determination have expanded in dramatic ways,19 the legal and 
ethical changes fostered by the informed-consent ideal have done 
little to reduce the diffused character of medical decision making in 
the United States.  Medical decisions are now binary rather than 
unitary, but remain devolved to the most particularized level of the 
delivery system.  If medical authority was atomized before, it is now 
molecular.  Although couched in a complex set of systems for 
delivery and payment, medical decision making remains centered on 
individual doctors and patients. 
Recent events illustrate the deeply entrenched nature of this 
authority structure.  One of the iconic images of the recent health-
reform debates was the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human 
 16. The working title of this article, which I expect to be published in 2011, 
is The Ghosts of Health Law Past. 
 17. See Nicole Huberfeld, Be Not Afraid of Change: Time To Eliminate the 
Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 243, 249–53 (2004) 
(describing the rise of corporate practice doctrine). 
 18. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 
899, 900–05 (1994) (describing the rise of the informed-consent doctrine after 
1957). 
 19. See Christine Laine & Frank Davidoff, Patient-Centered Medicine: A 
Professional Evolution, 275 JAMA 152, 152–53 (1996) (describing the “striking” 
change in physician attitudes toward patient awareness and involvement in 
treatment decisions). 
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Services, Kathleen Sebelius, appearing on television in November 
2009 to quell a growing uproar over the new recommendations for 
breast cancer screening that were promulgated by a little-known 
body called the United States Preventive Services Task Force (“Task 
Force”).20  The Task Force, comprised of a dozen independent 
medical experts under the auspices of the Federal Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, is authorized by federal statute to 
“conduct[] scientific evidence reviews of a broad range of clinical 
preventative health care services [and to] develop recommendations 
for primary care clinicians and health systems.”21  In this instance, 
the Task Force found that the risks and uncertainties associated 
with regular mammograms for healthy women under age fifty 
outweighed the therapeutic benefit of earlier screening, and so 
recommended against such regular screenings for women in their 
forties.22  The recommendations were grounded in sound science—
large-N studies from multiple countries—and were unanimously 
supported by the physicians and scientists who staffed the Task 
Force.23
Still, despite the fact that this recommended standard of care 
was entirely nonbinding on providers and payers, the Task Force’s 
action provoked an intense and immediate backlash from 
physicians, patients, and members of the broader public.24  Although 
a fraction of this opposition articulated a reasonable difference of 
opinion regarding risk assessment, much of the uproar was more 
fundamental, responding to a perceived intrusion by a centralized 
federal agency into a decision that had traditionally been vested in 
an individual patient and her physician.25  Members of the public, 
physicians, and politicians claimed that the Task Force was part of a 
broader effort to restructure American medical authority and to 
 20. See Stephanie Condon, Sebelius: Mammogram Recommendations Won’t 
Set Policy, CBS NEWS (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301 
-503544_162-5698251-503544.html. 
 21. See U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF), U.S. DEPARTMENT 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/USpstfix.htm (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2010). 
 22. U.S. Preventive Servs. Task Force, Screening for Breast Cancer: U.S. 
Preventive Services Task Force Recommendation Statement, 151 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 716, 716–17 (2009). 
 23. See Dan Eggen & Rob Stein, Mammograms and Politics: Task Force 
Stirs Up a Tempest, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2009, at A1. 
 24. See Valerie Richardson, Sebelius Shuns New Mammogram Report, 
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009 
/nov/19/sebelius-shuns-panels-advice-on-mammograms/. 
 25. See, e.g., Alexander Cautious of New Mammography Guidelines 
Released by Government Task Force, CONGRESSMAN RODNEY ALEXANDER (Dec. 3, 
2009), http://alexander.house.gov/index.cfm?sectionid=25&parentid=23 
&sectiontree=23,25&itemid=568 (“With these new guidelines, it is even more 
apparent to me that health care decisions need to be made by patients and their 
doctors.  We need to reinforce this important relationship, not weaken it with 
government intrusion.”). 
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bureaucratize treatment decisions.26  The Task Force’s tentative 
effort to standardize practice in this area had threatened the 
longstanding authority structure in American medicine, 
characterized by diffuse and individuated medical authority. 
Secretary Sebelius and others in the Obama administration 
were keenly aware of the deep roots and latent power of these 
structures and of the general resistance to medical centralization 
held by Americans, even if they may have been surprised at the 
intensity of this particular reaction.  Within a few days of the Task 
Force’s recommendation, Sebelius went to the media to expressly 
distance the administration from the panel and, more pointedly, 
from its epistemic assumption that medicine could be, or ought to 
be, standardized through collectivized expert agencies.27  Calling the 
Task Force an “outside independent panel of doctors” who “do not 
set federal policy,” Sebelius proclaimed that decisions on 
appropriate breast cancer testing, like other medical decisions, were 
appropriately devolved to the individual judgment of physician and 
patient.28  She told the nation’s women to “[k]eep doing what you 
have been doing for years,” and to “[t]alk to your doctor . . . and 
make the decision that is right for you.”29
In repudiating the Task Force and urging women to make the 
decision “right for” them, Sebelius clearly opted for a patient-
centered conception of decisional authority, as opposed to the 
tentative standardization proposed by the Task Force.  Although 
such a statement quelled the public outcry in the short term, the 
normative clash between these two visions of medical expertise is 
bound to recur in a system that is becoming increasingly 
interconnected, particularly given the scholarly and bureaucratic 
interest in giving greater prominence to expert cost-effectiveness 
research and best-practices standardization.  In a medical economy 
growing at unprecedented rates,30 and with cost increases driven in 
part by patient- and physician-driven therapeutic variation,31 the 
question is whether we can afford such heavily patient-centered 
medicine. 
A key question in light of these potentially conflicting visions is 
 26. See, e.g., Whitney Pitcher, Bureaucratization of Breast Cancer 
Screening?, THEPALINATION.COM (Nov. 20, 2009, 7:49 PM), 
http://www.thepalination.com/2009/11/bureaucratization-of-breast-cancer.html. 
 27. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Secretary 
Sebelius Statement on New Breast Cancer Recommendations (Nov. 18, 2009), 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/11/20091118a.html. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Thomas J. Parisi, How Much Did You Pay for Your Heart: Is a 
Centralized Entity Performing Health Technology Assessment with Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis the Answer to the Rising Costs of Healthcare?, 46 
JURIMETRICS 285, 287 (2009) (documenting the rising costs of health care). 
 31. See Molly Cooke, Cost Consciousness in Patient Care—What Is Medical 
Education’s Responsibility?, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1253, 1253–54 (2010). 
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whether a “patient-centered” approach to medical care is inevitably 
in conflict with an approach grounded in collective solidarity and 
advancement of system-wide cost and quality goals.  Put differently, 
is a well-meaning focus on the patient necessarily and entirely 
individualistic, or can a patient-centered ethos of medical care 
incorporate concern for broader systemic goals?  The challenge for 
the U.S. health care system in the coming decade and beyond will be 
to moderate the excesses of a decentralized authority structure, 
while retaining sensitivity to individual patient need and individual 
physician judgment.  I speculate briefly about whether such a 
dichotomous framing of authority is possible. 
At one level, of course, there are inevitable trade-offs.  Creating 
a system in which therapeutic choices are more sensitive to systemic 
externalities (whether resource-related or otherwise) inevitably 
involves some reorganization of authority.  Though not a zero-sum 
game, as discussed below, efforts to meaningfully standardize 
treatment protocols necessarily make incursions on the substantial 
decisional choice that has traditionally characterized American 
medicine in recent decades.  These incursions go beyond mere 
resource constraint (though they might occasionally manifest as 
resource constraint) and also threaten the independent value that 
physicians and patients place on choice itself.  As such, even regimes 
in other countries that have operationalized global budgets and cost-
effectiveness analysis still profess deference to individual physician 
judgment and the best interests of individual patients.  In Great 
Britain’s National Health Service, for instance, the National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Effectiveness (“NICE”) has been 
empowered to recommend against the use of new technologies that 
are too costly relative to their returns,32 but its recommendations 
contain the cautionary language that they cannot “over-ride the 
individual responsibility of healthcare professionals to make 
decisions appropriate to the circumstances of the individual 
patient.”33
The increasing interconnectedness of the U.S. health insurance 
system going forward will increase pressures to standardize 
allocation of resources, thus implicating a clash of normative values, 
given the entrenched individualized authority structures that exist.  
It is unlikely that an approach grounded in centralized budgeting or 
allocation will gain traction in the United States in the short- or 
medium-term.  The alternative to this extreme is to explore methods 
to reshape existing therapeutic relationships—and the law and 
financial arrangements that shape those relationships—to achieve 
greater sensitivity to values beyond those of the immediate patient 
 32. See David J. Kerr & Mairi Scott, British Lessons on Health Care 
Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. e21(1), e21(2) (2009). 
 33. R. v. Nat’l Inst. for Health & Clinical Excellence, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 
2722 (Eng.). 
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seeking treatment.  Whether such other-directed medical ethics and 
law can be made consistent with a “patient-centered” view of 
medicine is a crucial question that remains open. 
Building on existing law, policy, and scholarly commentary, I 
raise here three intermediate paradigms that may serve to point the 
way forward.  The first two conceptual reforms retain the specific 
physician-patient interaction as the fulcrum of medical decision 
making, but aim to modify the financial arrangements and legal 
duties that contextualize that relationship and exert influence on 
physician-patient decisions.  The traditional method of paying 
physicians for specific medical procedures (fee-for-service medicine), 
and the traditional fiduciary-duty doctrine that emphasizes loyalty 
to the patient above all other values, have both contributed to the 
fragmentation and individuation that characterizes American 
medicine.34  Although reforms on both fronts create uncertainty and 
grounds for concern, reforming payment policies and fiduciary laws 
are necessary steps toward a more balanced approach to medical 
care in the United States. 
It is hardly new to suggest the necessity of meaningful payment 
reform as a step in updating the American system of medicine—
such reforms are the centerpiece of much recent scholarship35 as 
well as a component of the recent PPACA.36  A common feature of 
most of the ideas for payment reform that currently proliferate is 
the goal of shifting payment models away from the traditional 
stochastic per-procedure basis, which incentivizes individual 
physicians and patients to collude to obtain more expensive care by 
shifting costs of procedures to private or governmental insurance 
pools.37  Accordingly, the common impulse is to restructure payment 
models to compensate providers for something more comprehensive 
than an unbundled set of health care inputs (procedures and 
therapies).  So, for instance, some reform models would pay 
physicians and hospitals “per episode” of care, while others would 
 34. See François de Brantes et al., Building a Bridge from Fragmentation 
to Accountability—The Prometheus Payment Model, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1033, 1033 (2009); Eike-Henner W. Kluge, Resource Allocation in Healthcare: 
Implications of Models of Medicine as a Profession, MEDSCAPE GEN. MED., Mar. 
21, 2007, at 57, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1925021/. 
 35. See Meredith B. Rosenthal, Beyond Pay for Performance—Emerging 
Models of Provider-Payment Reform, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1197, 1197–98 
(2008) (describing various payment-reform models). 
 36. See Sara Rosenbaum & Jonathan Gruber, Buying Health Care, the 
Individual Mandate, and the Constitution, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 401, 403 
(2010) (“In the end, the [PPACA] is all about altering individual economic 
conduct, and its importance lies in the way it changes the when and how of 
health care purchasing.”). 
 37. See David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Anatomy of Health 
Insurance, in 1A HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 563, 576–88 (Anthony J. 
Cuyler & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000) (discussing moral-hazard problems in 
traditional health insurance payment relationships). 
W16_RUGER 11/12/2010  12:21:43 AM 
2010] A PATIENT-CENTERED ETHOS 1521 
 
bundle episodes together and pay providers on an annual capitated 
basis for each patient in their care.38
The question of whether such bundled payment arrangements 
are, or can be made to be, compatible with a patient-centered model 
of care is hotly debated.39  To the extent that newer payment models 
disrupt the traditional autonomy that patients and physicians have 
traditionally enjoyed—autonomy that allows them to employ any 
procedure justified under the capacious “medical necessity” 
standard—they may initially appear to be less patient friendly.  But 
it bears emphasis that neither the classical fee-for-service model nor 
the fully capitated model is, at the extreme, intrinsically more 
matched to patient interests.  Both models contain the seeds of 
misaligned interests between providers and patients—the former by 
encouraging too much and too invasive medicine, the latter by 
incentivizing too little care.  That only capitation is regarded as 
dangerous is a testament to the medicalization of American health 
care—with its heavy focus on interventions and procedures—and to 
the continued entrenchment of that model today. 
Under any payment model, it is important to have a legal or 
bureaucratic backstop so that physicians squeezed by financial 
incentives will not shirk on patient care.  The traditional duty of due 
care offers one such backstop, as does the related duty of loyalty.  
Physicians bear fiduciary duties of loyalty and care (the malpractice 
standard) to their patients,40 and courts have made clear that 
innovative payment arrangements do not alter or release physicians 
from these baseline obligations.41  Courts have characterized the 
physician’s duty of loyalty as an “implied promise” that the patient 
should “be able to trust that the physician will act in the best 
interests of the patient thereby protecting the sanctity of the 
physician-patient relationship.”42  To the extent that this standard 
encourages physicians to take account of patient preferences and to 
be solicitous of patient interests, it is clearly aligned with a “patient-
centered” view of medicine.  But to the extent that it prioritizes 
fidelity to patient interests at the expense of all other systemic 
considerations, such a standard appears anachronistic in a regime of 
 38. See, e.g., Harold D. Miller, From Volume to Value: Better Ways To Pay 
for Health Care, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1418, 1419–20 (2009); Rosenthal, supra note 
35, at 1199. 
 39. See, e.g., Yunjie Song et al., Regional Variations in Diagnostic Practices, 
363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 45, 46 (2010). 
 40. See Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 799 (N.D. 
Ohio 1965) (recognizing the physician’s duty of care and duty of loyalty); 
Michael A. McCann, Message Deleted?  Resolving Physician-Patient E-Mail 
Through Contract Law, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 109–10 (2002–2003) (same). 
 41. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 236–37 (2000) (declining to 
expand fiduciary liability under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 
despite an innovative payment arrangement, because of the overlap with 
traditional malpractice liability). 
 42. Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 961 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). 
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greater interconnectedness and solidarity. 
Accordingly, another key challenge for retaining patient-
centeredness in a world of payment and delivery reform may be 
reframing the retention and modification of these baseline liability 
rules on physician conduct to be both patient focused and sensitive 
to broader values.  For those steeped in medical law and ethics, it 
may seem incongruous, even oxymoronic, to contemplate a “duty of 
loyalty” that is other-directed at all; traditionally the duty has been 
framed in terms of the specific patient or perhaps clearly identifiable 
third parties.  But looking beyond the four corners of health law to 
other fiduciary contexts offers some analogies.  Long-established 
principles of trust law acknowledge that a trust might have multiple 
beneficiaries, and these principles have thus imposed on fiduciaries 
duties of balance and even-handedness in dealing with 
beneficiaries.43  Importantly for the possible extension to medical 
care, this duty of fairness does not mean that all beneficiaries’ 
shares of trust assets must be precisely equal; instead, trust 
principles permit trustees to allocate greater shares to one 
beneficiary in response to his or her greater need.44  But at all times 
the fiduciary duty runs collectively to all beneficiaries, rather than 
individualistically. 
This impulse is occasionally reflected in positive statements of 
environmental law.  For instance, the National Environmental 
Policy Act contains as one of its precepts for governmental action the 
duty to “fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of 
the environment for succeeding generations.”45  That Act imposes a 
fiduciary duty on federal agencies with respect to environmental 
protection, but frames the duty of loyalty in broader terms that 
include an intertemporal duty to generations not yet existing.  
Under no conceivable formulation of a health care provider’s duty is 
a similarly broad fiduciary mandate thinkable, but a smaller 
measure of other-directedness is perhaps not out of the question for 
medical law and ethics in the future. 
I am skeptical that such an endeavor will, or ought to, dislodge 
medical ethics from its individualistic focus.  If that is the case, we 
might invert the question posed here: rather than make medical 
ethics more other-regarding, can we enhance sensitivity to patient 
concerns on the part of the public and private institutions that in 
future decades will exert more standardizing and collectivizing 
 43. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 (2007). 
 44. See id. cmt. b (“It would be overly simplistic, and therefore misleading, 
to equate impartiality with some concept of ‘equality’ of treatment or concern—
that is, to assume that the interests of all beneficiaries have the same priority 
and are entitled to the same weight in the trustee’s balancing of those 
interests.”). 
 45. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1) 
(2006). 
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pressures on the individual therapeutic relationship?  Here I think 
various existing design features are worth pursuing, in terms of the 
composition of such panels and agencies (to include patient 
representatives and decision rules permitting transparent dissent); 
in the design of the metrics used to evaluate “effective” care (to 
include patient-centric variables beyond merely optimal health 
status outcomes); and in the review of the decisions of such bodies 
by democratic processes and by an independent judiciary.  Consider, 
for instance, the rather tone-deaf promulgation of the 
mammography guidelines by the Task Force discussed above.  
Would the agency actions or communications relating to those ill-
fated guidelines have been different if the Task Force had included 
patient representatives or ethicists in addition to physician experts?  
The question is significant enough to merit spending significant 
time thinking about ways to make the new standardizing 
institutions of American health care more consistent with a patient-
centered ethos, even as inevitable tensions will remain. 
